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Abstract 
As projects grow in size and complexity, they become ever more difficult to manage. Project management often stumbles in 
very large and complex projects. Time and cost overruns are rife in such cases. As I will show, one of the key reasons for this is 
that non-contractual relationships between project parties begin to dominate contractual relationships as projects grow in size 
and complexity. The non-contractual gap also grows at a growing rate. It cannot be mastered by more contracts, however. Trust 
is the only viable way forward. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the IPMA. 
Keywords: principal-agent theory, project management, non-contractual gap, trust 
*
*
 Corresponding author. Tel.: +0-000-000-0000 ; fax: +0-000-000-0000 . 
E-mail address: anita@grad.hr
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
  e uthors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
i  a d peer-review under responsibil ty of the IPMA.
932   Anita Ceric /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  119 ( 2014 )  931 – 938 
1. Principal-agent theory and project management 
Projects are getting to be ever larger and more complex. A useful proxy for project size and complexity is the 
number of agents engaged in the project. The larger and more complex a project, the more likely it is to be one-off, 
as it binds the principal and all the agents only once. Moreover, the more likely it is to involve construction, which 
also requires substantial time to complete. And construction furthermore requires designers, engineers, and a wide 
variety of consultants. The largest projects, typically called megaprojects on account of their huge impact on 
society, are most often public ones, where the principal is ultimately the taxpayer (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2009: 177). 
In such cases, airports, highways, power-plants, and other major structures are involved. Many agents from both 
public and private realms are perforce engaged, and projects of this nature thus take years to bring to completion, 
often with unforeseen delays and cost overruns. 
The principal-agent theory offers a useful representation of the problem. For their work on the theory, George 
Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz shared a Nobel prize in economics in 2001. It provides one of the best 
known applications of information asymmetry in economics, which is the situation in which one of the two parties 
is better informed than the other, and in which they do not share the same interests (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Sharma, 
1997; Jensen, 2000). Different interests of principals and agents postulated by the theory have also been 
investigated from the vantage point of morality or ethics (e.g., Quinn & Jones, 1995). Among other fields, the 
theory has so far been applied to project management, where the focus has initially been on the relationship 
between the project owner and the project manager engaged for a particular project (e.g., Turner & Müller, 2004; 
Müller & Turner, 2005). However, it has also been extended to other agents, such as contractors, sub-contractors, 
designers, consultants, and so forth. 
In the simplest situation, the principal is called the project owner and the agent is called the contractor. Both are 
guided by self-interest, as well. According to the theory, opportunistic behavior can be expected from both. 
However, the relationship becomes increasingly complex as the number of project parties grows. It can be assumed 
throughout that agents will attempt to maximize their benefits even when that may involve a higher damage to the 
principal (Schieg, 2008). 
In accordance with the principal-agent theory, the following types of information asymmetry apply for project 
parties: hidden characteristics, hidden information, and hidden intention. Furthermore, these three types of 
information asymmetry respectively generate the following risks: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up 
(Jäger, 2008). Adverse selection involves information asymmetry when the principal does not have the specific 
qualifications of the agent, in which case it occurs before the contract between them is signed. The result can be the 
inappropriate choice of the contractual partner. When moral hazard is involved, however, information asymmetry 
occurs after the contract is signed. In this case, the principal cannot control all activities of the agents and an 
information imbalance favoring the agents may occur. If agents use this situation opportunistically, then this type 
of information asymmetry is known as moral hazard. In the case the principal makes significant investments in 
money or other resources because of the close relationship with an agent, and if these investments get lost in the 
case that the agent acts uncooperatively, then these result in the problem known as hold-up. Here, the principal has 
already made an irrevocable investment and this may enable the agent to confront the principal with unwarranted 
demands. 
It is good to remember that opportunistic behavior is not reserved only for agents. Principals are only human, as 
well. As Hendry (2002: 98) observes, most applications of the theory have been based on the “principal’s problem” 
arising from the opportunistic and self-interested behavior of agents. This is undoubtedly a biased perspective, as 
the principal-agent theory is concerned with opportunism of all the parties involved, including the principal. 
To introduce the problem of project organization in large and complex projects, I will first explore the network 
structure of projects with a small number of agents. This will be useful in laying out the problem. Then I will 
extend the discussion by considering more complex networks, at which point I will introduce the mathematical 
expressions regulating network growth. As I will show, the number of non-contractual relationships grows at a 
growing rate. By way of conclusion, I will show that the fate of large and complex projects ultimately depends on 
trust between the project parties. Contractual arrangements, no matter how well considered, are insufficient to 
guarantee project success as projects grow. 
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2. Project organization 
The project owner provides the financial resources for the project delivery, accepts the project milestones, and 
eventually accepts the project completion (Project Management Institute, 2000). Figure 1 shows the basic diagram 
representing the relationship between a project owner and a contractor hired to complete a project. Their 
relationship is contractual, and both are bound by the same contract. In addition, both of them are guided by self-
interest. All together, there are four relationships, two of which are contractual and two non-contractual. 
            
Fig. 1. Project Owner - Contractor relationship (PO: Project Owner C: Contractor) 
In any large and complex project, however, project managers represent both the project owner and the 
contractor, as shown in Figure 2 (Ceric, 2012a). The two form the project team. Now there are three contracts 
between the parties: one between the project owner and the agent, another between the project owner and project 
owner’s project manager, and the third between the contractor and contractor’s project manager. 
However, it should be noted there is no contract between the project managers, where the project owner’s 
project manager monitors the performance of the contractor’s project manager, and the contractor’s project 
manager informs the project owner’s project manager. Their conduct is guided by the two contracts each, but their 
direct relationship still remains non-contractual. At best, it is based on guidelines provided by professional 
organizations concerned with project management and related fields. It should also be noted that all the key players 
in a contract are also guided by self-interest. Taken together, there are twelve relationships, six of which are 
contractual, and six non-contractual. The key non-contractual relationships are the two between project managers. 
As I will show, they play an increasingly important role as projects grow in size and complexity. 
Fig. 2. Principal-agent theory framework for construction projects (PO: Project owner, C: Contractor, PMpo: Project owner’s project manager, 
PMc: Contractor’s project manager) (Ceric, 2012a)  
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Figure 3 shows all the above relationships in a project involving three parties (Ceric, 2012d). In addition to the 
contractor, the project owner has also hired a designer. Now there are 24 relationships between the project parties. 
Three project managers now form the project team. The project owner’s project manager monitors the other two, 
but they are not contractually related to each other once again. All together, there are ten contractual relationships 
regulated by five contracts. The contractor and the designer are not related by contract. Again, neither are the 
project managers forming the project team. With three project parties, there are 14 non-contractual relationships 
between them. 
Fig. 3. Principal-agent theory framework for construction projects (PO: Project owner, C: Contractor, D: Designer, PMpo: Project owner’s 
project manager, PMd: Designer’s project manager, PMc: Contractor’s project manager) (Ceric, 2012d) 
The figures show that non-contractual relationships start to dominate the contractual ones with no more than 
three project parties. In the case of complex projects that take considerable time to bring to completion, the project 
team becomes increasingly autonomous from the project owner, as well as the contractor, designer, and consultants 
as agents. 
Now, it has been shown by empirical research into project management that project managers take the key role 
in the construction phase, which often takes considerable time to complete (Ceric, 2012a; Ceric 2012b). In this 
phase, neither the principal nor the agents engaged are as important to the success of the project as are the project 
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managers from all the parties involved. The project’s fate is largely left to the project team, which is not internally 
bound by any direct contractual relationship whatsoever. 
3. The non-contractual gap 
What happens as the number of project parties grows, however? Table 1 and Figure 4 show the results for up to 
ten project parties following the same network structure as in Figures 2 and 3. Namely, each network is 
characterized by the project team of project managers surrounded by the principal and all the agents. The network 
structure remains topologically the same throughout, however. 
Figure 4: Project parties and relationships (Shaded area represents the non-contractual gap)
Table 1: Project parties and relationships 
Project 
Parties/ 
Relationships 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
All 12 24 40 60 84 112 144 180 220 
Contractual 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 
Non-
Contractual 6 14 26 42 62 86 114 146 182 
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If there were only x project parties, there would be x2 relationships between them. However, there are twice as 
many relationships when project managers are included. Also, they have x2 relationships between them. In 
addition, project managers have contracts with the principal and all the agents involved, accounting for additional 
2x relationships. The total number is given by Equation 1. 
y = 2x2 + 2x         (1) 
As the principal does not have a contract with itself, there are (x – 1) contracts between the project parties, 
which accounts for 2(x – 1) contractual relationships between the principal and the agents. In addition, the 
principal and all the agents have contracts with their project managers, which accounts for another 2x contractual 
relationships in the project. The total number is given by Equation 2. 
y = 4x – 2         (2) 
The number of non-contractual relationships is given by the difference between the number of all relationships 
and that of contractual relationships in the project. That difference is given by Equation 3. 
y = 2x2 – 2x + 2        (3) 
As Figure 4 shows, the non-contractual gap grows at a growing rate. In particular, the number of contractual 
relationships is governed by a linear equation (Equation 2), while the number of non-contractual relationships is 
governed by a power equation, just as the number of all relationships between project parties (Equation 3). It grows 
as the second power of the number of project parties. 
As Table 1 demonstrates, about 30 percent of all relationships is contractual with five project parties, while only 
about 17 percent of all relationships are contractual in the case that there are ten project parties. As the number of 
project parties grows, the gap between contractual and non-contractual relationships gapes ever larger, as shown by 
the shaded area. That gap cannot be closed by additional contracts, however. There cannot possibly be more 
contracts than specified by Equation 2. 
4. The key role of trust 
As the principal-agent theory shows, even contractual relationships can be guided by opportunistic behavior 
between the project parties. However, such behavior is even more difficult to assess, let alone to control, in non-
contractual relationships. For instance, project managers forming the project team can either collude to the 
detriment of the project owner or the agents, or they can engage in internal conflict detrimental to the project 
owner. It is thus not surprising that the main strategy in the management of large projects is found by empirical 
research to be trust (Ceric, 2012c). Although contracts play an important role in such projects, trust appears to be 
the only viable way forward. 
In particular, the research mentioned above was based on Schieg (2008), who offered the following risk-
minimization strategies as most promising in the management of construction projects: bureaucratic control 
(contracts), information systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture, reputation, and trust. The project 
managers involved in the ranking of these strategies had appreciable experience in sizable construction projects 
across a considerable number of countries. The ranking of strategies established by this research shows that trust is 
considered to be the winning strategy, followed by bureaucratic control (contracts), information systems, 
reputation, corporate culture, and incentives, in that order (Ceric, 2012c). In short, contracts and the remaining 
strategies do have a role to play, but they can be successful only up to a point. 
As I have shown, the gap between contractual and non-contractual relationships grows as projects grow. More 
important, it grows at a growing rate. Even in projects with a relatively small number of agents, non-contractual 
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relationships between them dominate contractual relationships. If anything goes wrong with a project, and 
something is liable to go wrong in large projects, legal problems surrounding non-contractual relationships quickly 
turn into a legal quagmire. 
The only remedy to the risk of failure in large and complex projects is an awareness of the non-contractual gap 
that arises with a growing number of agents. Again, this gap itself cannot be addressed by additional contractual 
arrangements, but project parties can endeavor to increase the trust between project parties. As we have already 
seen, trust is the only viable strategy ensuring successful project completion. 
As Zaghloul and Hartman (2003: 421) point out, there is a cost to mistrust: “With the absence of trust in 
business relationships, there is a significant need for good and powerful control system to manage and administrate 
the contracting process. However, even with the existence of this powerful control system (the contract 
documents), with the absence of trust, the success of any project or business relationship is always questionable.” 
Furthermore, Kadefors (2004: 176) points out that trust also has costs. Most important, Wicks et al. (1999) argue 
that there is an optimal level of trust in each situation, and that trust rises with interdependency between project 
parties. Therefore, these are pointers for further research. And I cannot but trust my research colleagues in this 
great endeavor. 
It is interesting to note in closing that these thoughts are consistent with those of the great German philosopher 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1807). He considers the lordship-bondage dialectic, which is often rendered in 
English as the master-slave dialectic. Neither the independent nor the dependent actor, here the principal and the 
agent, can win without transcending the inherent conflict, for both of them ultimately depend on each other. In the 
last analysis, transcendence demands trust between the actors for the benefit of the project they share. 
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